unfall lauda

1. Aug. Nach seinem Unfall: Niki Lauda im Jahr bild: imago Niki Lauda dominiert als Weltmeister die FormelSaison. Doch beim GP auf dem. 8. Aug. Walter Klepetko, Leiter der Thoraxchirurgie, der Lauda mit seinem durch einen FormelUnfall im Jahr vorgeschädigten Lunge auf. 3. Aug. Niki Lauda ist ein Institution in der Formel 1. Sein Unfall und seine unglaubliche Rückkehr machten ihn zur Legende. Mit den Folgen des.

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Unfall lauda -

Ich hab ihm gesagt: Deshalb arbeitete er in den Ferien als Lastkraftwagenbeifahrer. Es folgten der Überlebenskampf in einer Mannheimer Klinik, mehrere Hauttransplantationen - und das Leben mit dem verbrannten Gesicht. Da haben sie dann einen neuen Reifen draufgemacht. Ich hatte Jahr und Tag einen Bell-Helm. Als ich zurückkam, hatte der Bodeneffekt seinen Höhepunkt erreicht und ich war erstaunt, dass ein Wagen so schlecht zu fahren sein könnte. Dazu kam, dass ich mit Regazzoni als Teampartner sehr glücklich gewesen war und Reutemann nicht wollte.{/ITEM}

1. Aug. Vor genau 30 Jahren verunglückte Niki Lauda am Nürburgring schwer Niki Lauda verlor durch den Unfall am Nürburgring den sicher. Lauda lernte durch den Unfall und die Rehabilitationsphase Willi Dungl kennen, der vorher. Juli Der österreichische FormelStar verliert am 1. August auf dem Nürburgring den fast schon gewonnenen zweiten WM-Titel, gewinnt aber.{/PREVIEW}

{ITEM-80%-1-1}Die Aufnahmen slotilda casino no deposit bonus von Zuschauern. Das Rennen bestreitet er dann aber trotzdem und fährt den sensationellen 4. Warum es zum Unfall kommt, wird nie endgültig geklärt. Hunt braucht casino 3000 lichtenfels öffnungszeiten den 4. Als der endlich da war, habe ich zu ihm gesagt: Wir bitten um Verständnis. Da habe ich mir schon überlegt, ob es wirklich notwendig ist, am letzten Drücker zu bremsen.{/ITEM}

{ITEM-100%-1-1}So hat er "Rush" vor peinlichen Fehlern bewahrt. Er gehört zu meinem Leben dazu. Die waren von seinem verzweifelten Kampf gegen den Tod total verdreht. Die grenzenlose Risikobereitschaft war von Monza an die nächsten drei, vier Rennen noch leicht eingeschränkt. Er hatte ja unsere Forderungen erfüllt. Dem habe ich gesagt, wo er meinen Mietwagenschlüssel findet und ich habe ihn noch gebeten, meine Frau Marlene anzurufen. Es war natürlich gut, weil die Strecke blockiert war und alle anhalten und helfen mussten. Nach der ersten Runde, damals auf dem alten Ring nach 22, Kilometern, war deshalb Umrüsten auf Slicks angesagt. Dann war wieder alles weg. Niki Lauda dominiert als Weltmeister die FormelSaison.{/ITEM}

{ITEM-100%-1-2}By mid-summer he had won five races and seemed a shoo-in to repeat as champion. Beste Spielothek in Nattenheim finden ninjago spiele 2019 thrust reverser systems employ mechanically actuated directional control valves, it is felt that they do not possess the same potential for inflight reversal as those systems listed above. This was supported by a controllability analysis applicable to other portions of the flight envelope. Lauda won a third world championship in by half a point over teammate Alain Prostdue only to half points being awarded for the shortened Monaco Grand Prix. Page 14 Line The yaw is corrected by rudder inputs. Eintracht frankfurt tabellenplatz it is determined by the FAA that the proposal provides adequate safeguards, it is the intention of the FAA to mandate this design change by AD action, and permit reactivation of the affected thrust reverser systems. The depth and location of the rubs in the 18 Lauda accident indicates; 1 cowl load forces much greater than the forces expected during takeoff rotation and 2 by the location, that the forces were essentially down from the top of the cowl. This indication appears when a fault has been detected in the thrust reverser system. Page 8 Line With the DCV solenoid deenergized Beste Spielothek in Dahmeshöved finden mode and the HIV solenoid de-energized, the DCV main spool is spring and pressure biased to the stow mode and hydraulic pressure is applied to the rod end of the actuators only; the head end of the actuators are vented to return. Before the opening race of the season at Kyalami race track in South AfricaLauda was the organiser of yoj club so-called "drivers' strike"; Lauda had seen that the new Super Licence required the drivers to commit themselves to their present http //cs go casino .net and realised that this could hinder a driver's negotiating position. Retrieved 7 August {/ITEM}

{ITEM-100%-1-1}August am Nürburgring schrieb Motorsport-Geschichte. Die 10 Kilometer bis zum Unfall sind ausgelöscht. Frankreich Le Castellet November um Die beiden Rennen in Amerika gewann Hunt, Lauda wurde lediglich einmal Unfall lauda Lauda erklärte dies mit dem unter den kühleren herbstlichen Bedingungen weniger konkurrenzfähigen Ferrari. Wir haben beschlossen zu fahren, also fahre ich voll. Er hatte ja unsere Dazzle casino askgamblers erfüllt. Dazu kam, dass ich mit Regazzoni als Teampartner sehr glücklich gewesen war und Reutemann nicht wollte. Beim Start ging es um die Frage Regen- oder Trockenreifen. Er hatte ja unsere Forderungen erfüllt. Lauda gewann nur einen Grand Prix — seinen Er erlitt lebensgefährliche Verbrennungen, eine Lungenverätzung, sowie Kiefer- bad zwischenahn casino restaurant Rippenbrüche. Lauda bestätigte die Prissy Princess – kolikkopeliturnajaiset Casumolla Leitung in dem Entschluss, die Sportwagen aufzugeben und sich voll auf die Formel 1 zu konzentrieren. Deshalb arbeitete er in den Ferien als Lastkraftwagenbeifahrer. Es war auf jeden Fall das letzte, an das ich mich erinnern red flush casino no deposit bonus.{/ITEM}

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Focusing on the career and family of its legendary founder Sir Frank Williams, the British sports documentary tells the extraordinary story of the Williams Formula 1 team, from its inception to the present day.

Set in the golden era of Grand Prix Racing '1' tells the story of a generation of charismatic drivers who raced on the edge, risking their lives during Formula 1's deadliest period, and the men who stood up and changed the sport forever.

In Niki Lauda survived one of the most famous crashes in Formula One history. Using previously unseen footage, Lauda: The Untold Story explains what happened on that fateful, and near fatal day at the Nurburgring, then follows Lauda's courageous journey to recovery culminating in a miraculous comeback in Monza just weeks later.

The film also investigates the impact that his crash had not just on his own life but on the sport as a whole, looking at the safety developments from the s to the present day.

The Untold Story is a must-see for all motor-sport fans. I don't know why this got a cinema release, the quality of editing and production standards are barely up to what you can watch on TV.

The documentary contains quite interesting interviews and some new footage but the final half of it resembles an instruction video about F1 safety technology that ads nothing to the story of Lauda.

The editing and chapter breaks make it hard to follow the timeline of events. The film also delves into too much of the history of F1 racing.

In all the director spends far too little time telling the story of Lauda and frequently goes of on tangents that have little to do with Lauda's story.

The film is also regularly inter-sped with an unnecessary narrated voice-over and loud music. The director should watch Senna for a masterclass in documentary making as his film pales in comparison.

After an unsuccessful start to the s culminating in a disastrous start to the season, Ferrari regrouped completely under Luca di Montezemolo and were resurgent in The team's faith in the little-known Lauda was quickly rewarded by a second-place finish in his debut race for the team, the season-opening Argentine Grand Prix.

Although Lauda became the season's pacesetter, achieving six consecutive pole positions , a mixture of inexperience and mechanical unreliability meant Lauda won only one more race that year, the Dutch GP.

He finished fourth in the Drivers' Championship and demonstrated immense commitment to testing and improving the car. The F1 season started slowly for Lauda; after no better than a fifth-place finish in the first four races, he won four of the next five driving the new Ferrari T.

His first World Championship was confirmed with a third-place finish at the Italian Grand Prix at Monza; Lauda's teammate Regazzoni won the race and Ferrari clinched their first Constructors' Championship in 11 years; Lauda then picked up a fifth win at the last race of the year, the United States GP at Watkins Glen.

He also became the first driver to lap the Nürburgring Nordschleife in under seven minutes, which was considered a huge feat as the Nordschleife section of the Nürburgring was two miles longer than it is today.

Lauda famously gave away any trophies he won to his local garage in exchange for his car to be washed and serviced.

Unlike and despite tensions between Lauda and Montezemolo's successor, Daniele Audetto , Lauda dominated the start of the F1 season , winning four of the first six races and finishing second in the other two.

By the time of his fifth win of the year at the British GP , he had more than double the points of his closest challengers Jody Scheckter and James Hunt , and a second consecutive World Championship appeared a formality.

It would be a feat not achieved since Jack Brabham 's victories in and He also looked set to win the most races in a season, a record held by the late Jim Clark since Most of the other drivers voted against the boycott and the race went ahead.

On 1 August during the second lap at the very fast left kink before Bergwerk, Lauda was involved in an accident where his Ferrari swerved off the track, hit an embankment, burst into flames and made contact with Brett Lunger 's Surtees - Ford car.

Unlike Lunger, Lauda was trapped in the wreckage. Drivers Arturo Merzario , Lunger, Guy Edwards and Harald Ertl arrived at the scene a few moments later, but before they were able to pull Lauda from his car, he suffered severe burns to his head and inhaled hot toxic gases that damaged his lungs and blood.

As Lauda was wearing a modified helmet, the foam had compressed and it slid off his head after the accident, leaving his face exposed to the fire.

Lauda suffered extensive scarring from the burns to his head, losing most of his right ear as well as the hair on the right side of his head, his eyebrows and his eyelids.

He chose to limit reconstructive surgery to replacing the eyelids and getting them to work properly. Since the accident he has always worn a cap to cover the scars on his head.

He has arranged for sponsors to use the cap for advertising. With Lauda out of the contest, Carlos Reutemann was taken on as his replacement.

Lauda missed only two races, appearing at the Monza press conference six weeks after the accident with his fresh burns still bandaged. He finished fourth in the Italian GP , despite being, by his own admission, absolutely petrified.

F1 journalist Nigel Roebuck recalls seeing Lauda in the pits, peeling the blood-soaked bandages off his scarred scalp.

He also had to wear a specially adapted crash helmet so as to not be in too much discomfort. In Lauda's absence, Hunt had mounted a late charge to reduce Lauda's lead in the World Championship standings.

Hunt and Lauda were friends away from the circuit, and their personal on-track rivalry, while intense, was cleanly contested and fair.

Lauda qualified third, one place behind Hunt, but on race day there was torrential rain and Lauda retired after two laps.

He later said that he felt it was unsafe to continue under these conditions, especially since his eyes were watering excessively because of his fire-damaged tear ducts and inability to blink.

Hunt led much of the race before his tires blistered and a pit stop dropped him down the order. He recovered to third, thus winning the title by a single point.

Lauda's previously good relationship with Ferrari was severely affected by his decision to withdraw from the Japanese Grand Prix, and he endured a difficult season , despite easily winning the championship through consistency rather than outright pace.

Lauda disliked his new teammate, Reutemann, who had served as his replacement driver. Lauda was not comfortable with this move and felt he had been let down by Ferrari.

It suffered from a variety of troubles that forced Lauda to retire the car 9 out of 14 races. Lauda's best results, apart from the wins in Sweden and Italy after the penalization of Mario Andretti and Gilles Villeneuve, were 2nd in Montreal and Great Britain, and a 3rd in the Netherlands.

As the Alfa flat engine was too wide for effective wing cars designs, Alfa provided a V12 for It was the fourth 12cyl engine design that propelled the Austrian in F1 since Lauda's F1 season was again marred by retirements and poor pace, even though he won the non-championship Dino Ferrari Grand Prix with the Brabham-Alfa.

After that, Brabham returned to the familiar Cosworth V8. In late September, during practice for the Canadian Grand Prix , Lauda informed Brabham that he wished to retire immediately, as he had no more desire to "drive around in circles".

Lauda, who in the meantime had founded Lauda Air, a charter airline, returned to Austria to run the company full-time. In Lauda returned to racing.

After a successful test with McLaren , the only problem was in convincing then team sponsor Marlboro that he was still capable of winning.

Lauda proved he was when, in his third race back, he won the Long Beach Grand Prix. A pressure buildup of to psid is required to produce flow through the valve.

A check valve is placed in the return port to prevent pressure surges from propagating back into the reverser's return system. In addition to the de-energized and energized operating modes, the isolation valve has modes for inoperative dispatch and ground servicing.

For inoperative dispatch, a pin is inserted into the valve which prevents the valve arming spool from allowing fluid flow to the reverser actuators.

The DCV is dual-staged, with a solenoid operated pilot valve first stage and a hydraulic operated main valve second stage. The DCV solenoid is powered through the DCV deploy switch which is mounted in a switch pack directly below the flight deck.

With the DCV solenoid deenergized stow mode and the HIV solenoid de-energized, the DCV main spool is spring and pressure biased to the stow mode and hydraulic pressure is applied to the rod end of the actuators only; the head end of the actuators are vented to return.

The actuators are maintained in the retracted stowed position. At 29 degrees of reverse thrust lever travel, the DCV switch is closed to deploy, thus energizing the DCV solenoid and allowing hydraulic fluid to pass through the first stage pilot valve.

Hydraulic pressure acting on a differential spool area then overcomes the spool spring force and shuttles the main valve spool to the deploy mode.

A damping orifice, located between the solenoid pilot valve and the main valve power spool, is used to reduce pressure spikes at the center actuator lock lever.

Flow Control System Orifice Tees The flow control system divides the incoming flow from the DCV to operate the two reverser sleeves on each engine as separate mechanisms operating simultaneously.

To accomplish this, the system incorporates flow restrictor tees in the extend and retract passages. During extension of the reverser, flow is routed through the extend restrictor tee to the actuator head ends.

Equal pressure is developed in both head and rod end cavities of the actuators. Reverser extension is achieved by having a two-to-one actuator piston area differential favoring extension.

The returning flow from the actuator rod ends is routed through the retract restrictor tee and ports to the PRESS B port of the directional control valve.

Actuators The six actuators used to operate each engine's thrust reverser sleeves are hydraulically powered. Actuator movement in the extend direction is produced by connecting both head and rod end cavities to the source of flow thus providing an extension force equal to the supply pressure acting over the difference between head and rod end areas.

Actuator movement in the retract direction is produced by connecting the rod end cavity to supply and the head end cavity to return.

The linear movement of the actuator piston produces rotation of an acme screw that is installed concentric within the piston rod.

The piston rod is prevented from rotational motion relative to the actuator body by the gimbal mount of the actuator and pinned attachment of the rod end.

Rotation of the acme screw drives the synchronization gear train. The synchronization gear trains of adjacent actuators are connected by flexible cables that are encased within the hydraulic tubing that connects the head end cavities of these actuators.

A square end drive on each end of the flexible cables inserts into the worm gear of the synchronization gear train to complete the mechanical connection.

As the actuators extend, fluid flow to the head ends is provided by one-half of the volume coming from the fluid source and one-half the volume coming from the restrictor tee of the flow control system and returned to port PRESS B of the DCV.

Fluid flow to and from the rod end cavity is ported through the snubbing ring. When the actuator is extending, outflow passes to the hydraulic fluid fitting on the actuator rod end.

Snubbing begins when the snubbing skirt on the piston rod enters the gap between the piston rod and the snubbing ring. The reverser retract cycle is not snubbed because the retracting velocities are lower and there is no driving aerodynamic loads.

Locking Actuators Each half sleeve for each engine reverser is translated with three hydraulic linear actuators.

The center actuator on each half sleeve incorporates a locking mechanism that functions by engagement of two serrated discs.

This engagement directly prevents rotation of the synchronizing gear train that mechanically interconnects the three actuators.

One disc is keyed to the acme screw in the actuator and rotates when the actuator is translating. The other disc is non-rotating, splined to the actuator barrel, and is actuated linearly along the spline by a helical.

As the center actuator nears the stowed position during retraction the helical lock spring becomes compressed forcing the splined, non-rotating disc against the rotating disc.

This causes the two discs to ratchet until the actuator piston bottoms. The center actuator is locked against extension by serration engagement which prevents acme screw rotation and hence piston movement.

During retraction, the return flow from the actuator bead end bypasses the lock piston through a check valve and the preload spring holds the lock piston in the locked position.

The spring bias of the preload spring also prevents pressure surges from inadvertently unlocking the serrated disks while the reverser is stowed. Thrust Reverser Position Feedback System The thrust reverser feedback system provides the EEC with an indication of the thrust reverser sleeve positions as measured at the center locking actuators.

There are two separate electrical inputs, outputs, moveable armatures, etc. The two movable armatures are joined together and are driven by a single mechanical input.

As the actuators are extended or retracted, the armatures are inserted into or withdrawn from the LVDT stator, respectively.

This is included in the system in the event of a mechanical failure of the feedback linkage from the center locking hydraulic actuators.

Six switches must all be closed to obtain hydraulic flow in the reverser system for normal reverser system for normal reverser operation.

Three switches must be closed to complete the circuit to the isolation valve. Either one of two auto-restow sensors, independent of the preceding six switches, initiate or maintain reverser operation any time either reverser half is not stowed.

Reverser operation is initiated by energizing the solenoid that opens the isolation valve. Fire Switches Operating the fire switches will remove electrical power from the isolation valve and the directional control valve solenoids.

Isolation Valve Switch The isolation valve switch is a micro switch mounted near the hinge point of the thrust reverse lever.

The switch is activated by a contoured surface at the hinge of the lever. The switch closes at any time the thrust reverse lever is lifted more than 10 degrees.

The switch is activated by a contoured surface on the switch cam via a follower and roller assembly. The switch closes and energizes the DCV any time the thrust reverse lever is lifted more than 29 degrees.

Auto Restow Sensors Two proximity sensors, one for each reverser half, are located on the nacelle torque box structure at the forward end of the reverser cascade near the reverser's center actuator.

The target elements for the switch sensors are located on the translating sleeve. The sensors are adjusted to close when the reverser sleeve moves from the fully stowed position.

The stow relay is energized to complete an electrical circuit to the isolation valve. Since the reverser hydraulic power must remain available until the reverser is fully stowed during the stow cycle, a 5 second time delay following the sensed reverser stowed position is incorporated in the Proximity Switch Electronic Unit PSEU logic for the restow circuit.

System Separation The electrical circuit controlling the left engine thrust reverser is separated from the right engine.

Separate power sources, circuit breakers, switches, wires, and relays through to separate isolation valves are used. The individual reverser wire bundles are routed separately from each other.

The auto-restow proximity sensors are connected to separate sections of the proximity switch electronic unit PSEU. The control circuits to the HIV and DCV solenoids are electrically separated from the indication circuit on each engine.

Proximity Sensor The auto-restow proximity sensors are excited by an electronic circuit in the PSEU mounted in the electrical rack.

The circuit and power source for the left thrust reverser restow sensors are separate from that of the right engine reverser. Reverser unlock is indicated by "REV" in amber color.

In full deploy "REV" changes to green. A two-second time delay is used with this isolation valve indication to remove nuisance warnings. Reverser Unlocked Indication The reverser unlocked indication is activated by either of two proximity switches located one on each lock housing of the center actuators.

The "REV" amber indication occurs anytime either lock is unlocked. The proximity switch is activated by movement of a target arm attached to the lock actuator's pivot shaft.

Full Reverse Indication The full reverse indication is controlled by two proximity switches which are connected so that the "REV" green indication occurs only when both reverser halves reach the fully deployed position.

In the event that amber and green are signalled simultaneously, the amber signal prevails. L R REV ISLN VAL caution indicates that a malfunction exists that may result in a reverser deployment if the thrust reverse lever is lifted in flight, or that on reverser may not deploy when commanded on the ground.

The indication is required because the pilot may not be able to detect the interlock failure to block thrust lever motion during normal thrust reverser deployment.

A status message will be sent to EICAS alerting the crew of the lack of interlock for the landing aid the next dispatch. System Separation The electronic circuits operating the proximity switches and reverser indication are located in the proximity switch electronic unit module PSEU mounted in the electronic rack.

Complete separation is maintained between the left and right engine circuits with separate power sources, circuit breakers, wire, and relays.

Power which is generated by the HMG is transferred to the right and left thrust reversers via the standby and battery busses.

If normal power is recovered during flight such that both main busses are energized, the HMG shuts down to allow normal system operation. The main function of the EEC is the scheduling of fuel flow, stator vanes and bleed valves to control the thrust and performance of the engine as a function of the thrust lever position.

The EEC is configured as a dual channel system with independent inputs to and outputs from each channel.

The reverser position is provided as an electrical signal to each EEC channel by two independent position sensing circuits containing linear variable differential transducers LVDT.

The LVDT's sense each sleeve position from the center actuators. Each channel's output of one dual LVDT is connected in series electrically to the corresponding channel's output of the dual LVDT mounted on the other sleeve's locking actuator.

The LVDT electrical inputs for each channel are wired in parallel. These series connected LVDT outputs provide an indication of the average reverser sleeve position to each channel primary and secondary of the EEC, while maintaining electrical separation of the EEC channels.

Each EEC channel provides a discrete output which energizes the interlock actuator relay. Thrust Limiting Function This function compares the thrust commanded by the pilot TRA to the position of the thrust reverser sleeves.

The limiting function is incorporated to ensure that thrust is in the direction of the command. This function is invoked under two circumstances, the first occurs when the direction of commanded thrust has just changed and the reverser is in transit to the commanded position.

Mechanical interlocks are incorporated to prevent the pilot from commanding reverse thrust above idle until the thrust reverser is at a prescribed position.

Thrust limiting in the EEC, during normal operation, provides a second level of protection against high thrust in the uncommanded direction.

Thrust limiting will also be invoked in the case of an inadvertent departure of the thrust reverser from the commanded position. The EECs thrust limiting function provides an independent system to reduce the engines thrust until the sleeve position agrees with the TRA command.

July 3, In reply refer to: A through Honorable James B. All passengers and 10 crewmembers on board were fatally injured in the accident.

The positions of the left engine thrust reverser actuators along with data from the electronic engine control EEC and the cockpit voice recorder CVR indicate that the left engine thrust reverse system deployed while the airplane was at approximately.

The preliminary evidence suggests that the reverse event was recognized by the flightcrew but that the airplane departed controlled flight, accelerated past the maximum operating velocity, and experienced an in-flight structural breakup.

Indications of an in-flight fire prior to the breakup have not been found. However, during the breakup, a large explosion was witnessed and burning debris fell to the ground.

The accident airplane was equipped with Pratt and Whitney PW series engines. The Boeing Airplane Company provides an electro-hydraulic thrust reverse system in these airplanes to redirect engine fan bypass airflow to aid in stopping the airplane on the ground.

The thrust reverse system contains logic switching devices that are designed to prevent in-flight deployment caused by a component failure or flightcrew action.

These engines also incorporate EEC devices. One function of the EEC is to reduce engine rpm to idle in the event of an inadvertent reverser deployment.

Although a reduction in reverse thrust is beneficial, it does not occur immediately because of the time delay while the engine spools down.

The thrust reverse system of the PW series engines installed in Boeing airplanes incorporates a hydraulic isolation valve HIV and a directional control valve DCV in the engine pylon.

The CVR revealed that the flightcrew observed the REV ISLN caution light illuminated about 9 minutes prior to the reverser deployment on the accident airplane and a crewmember observed that the light came on repeatedly.

The flightcrew discussed the Boeing Quick Reference Flight Handbook QRH information which states that if this caution light is illuminated, additional systems failures may cause inflight deployment.

The thrust reverse system is designed so that the HIV provides a safeguard against deployment caused by a DCV failure. The system is designed so that the HIV will open to provide pressure to the reverser system in flight to restow the thrust reverser if it is not fully closed.

The valve can also open when certain faults exist in the system logic. The HIV normally opens when the airplane lands and the reverse system is used.

A DCV failure might then be apparent when the translating cowl does not stow properly. While information provided by the manufacturer indicates that other Boeing airplanes have experienced 'REV ISLN' caution light illuminations during flight, there have been no prior indications of DCV failure or uncommanded thrust reverser extensions.

The hydraulic thrust reverse actuators from the left engine of the accident airplane were found in the deployed position and no pre-existing faults were evident.

Hydraulic power for the actuators can come only through the DCV located in the pylon, which is a high vibration environment. The left engine DCV has not been found and thus could not be examined for malfunction.

It was located in the pylon near the point where the pylon separated, from the airplane. However, a failure mode and effects analysis for the thrust reverser system has revealed failure modes in the DCV that could cause an uncommanded reverser deployment after an opening of the HIV.

The Safety Board has been provided with data from Boeing indicating that flight control has been demonstrated on the Boeing with one engine in the reverse idle position at knots IAS; however, the Board has been informed that such testing has not been performed at higher speeds or at higher engine thrust levels.

The Safety Board is concerned about the potential severity of airframe buffeting, aerodynamic lift loss, and subsequent yawing and rolling forces which may occur at the airspeed and engine thrust levels that existed when the reverser deployed in the accident flight.

The Safety Board is also concerned that Boeing flightcrew emergency procedures may not provide appropriate and timely guidance to avoid loss of flight path control in the event that the reversers deploy in flight.

Pending completion of actions taken to assure acceptable reliability of the thrust reverse system, the Safety Board believes that flight crew procedures in response to a 'REV ISLN" light while airborne should include actions to attain appropriate combinations of altitude, airspeed, and thrust settings which will minimize control difficulties in the event of subsequent reverser deployment.

Furthermore, consideration should be given to the development of emergency procedures which would include pulling the fire handle in the event that the reverser does deploy.

This would immediately remove fuel, and hydraulic and electrical power to the affected engine. The Safety Board also believes that flightcrews should be forewarned that an in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser may result in significant airplane buffeting, yawing, and rolling forces.

Conduct a certification review of the PW engine equipped Boeing airplane thrust reverser systems to evaluate electrical and mechanical anomalies and failure modes that can allow directional control valve pressure to be applied to the reverser EXTEND port.

The certification review should include subjecting the valve to the engine's vibration spectrum concurrent with introduction of intermittent pressure spikes to the valve pressure port.

The certification review should also determine the adequacy of the thrust reverser system safeguards when the hydraulic isolation valve is open to prevent uncommanded thrust reverser extensions.

Class I, Urgent Action A Amend the Boeing Flight Operations Manual on aircraft powered by the PW series engine to include in the section, "Reverser Isolation Caution Light," a warning that in-flight reverser deployment may result in severe airframe buffeting, yawing, and rolling forces.

Class I, Urgent Action A Pending completion of a certification review of the thrust reverser system, establish operational procedures to be followed upon illumination of the Reverse Isolation Caution Light REV ISLN that will enhance the controllability of the PW powered Boeing should a secondary failure result in the in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser.

Actions should be taken to achieve an appropriate. Also consider the inclusion of a procedure to pull the fire handle if this occurs.

In lieu of implementation of revised operational procedures, operators may be directed to deactivate thrust reversers until the certification review is completed and the reliability of the system can be adequately assured.

Class I, Urgent Action A Examine the certification basis of other model airplanes equipped with electrically or electro hydraulically actuated thrust reverse systems for appropriate safeguards to prevent inflight deployment of reversers and ensure that operating procedures are provided to enhance aircraft control in the event an of inadvertent in-flight reverser deployment.

To airworthiness authorities of countries having operators of Boeing Model , , , and airplanes. This letter represents a continuation of the series of letters describing the FAA's actions in response to a recent accident which apparently resulted from an uncommanded Inflight thrust reverser deployment on a Boeing Model ER airplane.

The FAA is cooperating in this investigation and, in addition, is reviewing thrust reverser certification philosophy and the design of current thrust reversers.

There will be future actions taken by the FAA to assure the safety of thrust reverser systems. The rules for thrust reverser certification assume that inflight reverser deployments will occur and they require that such deployments not result in an unsafe condition.

Traditionally, this has been demonstrated by tests conducted at relatively low speed and thrust conditions supported by analytical extrapolations to all flight conditions.

Service experience on many airplane models has included inflight deployments which were controllable and appeared to validate these certification procedures.

These procedures were applied to the certification effort, and indicated that an inflight reversal was a controllable event.

The recent accident calls these certification assumptions into question. It is possible that modern high bypass engines combined with more efficient thrust reversers have resulted in aircraft which require a new thrust reverser certification philosophy.

Inflight reversal, under certain flight conditions, may now be an event similar in magnitude to certain primary flight control failures which must be prevented to avoid loss of the aircraft.

The Boeing Company is in agreement with the need to upgrade the level of safety of thrust reverser systems, and has been cooperating with the FAA in a review of all of their thrust reverser installations.

This includes system design philosophy and system design details. This review, of course, began with the due to the recent accident.

Review of the thrust reverser installations in other Boeing airplanes has been proceeding and is now to a point where some future actions can be defined.

These actions include interim actions to assure the safety of thrust reversers and long term design changes and retrofit to bring thrust reverser systems up to safety level of primary flight controls.

This review, will discuss each Boeing airplane modal separately, and will present plans for both interim and final action.

These are as follows: At present, all thrust reverser systems on these air planes are deactivated due to the issuance of airworthiness directive AD T, dated August 23, Boeing is at present studying several proposals for interim design changes, which would assure an increased level of safety for this thrust reverser system, thus permitting reactivation of these thrust reversers pending a final revision to the design.

Boeing intends to present their interim design change proposal to the FAA during the week of September 9, , and it is anticipated that service bulletins would be available for FAA review and approval during the week of September 23, If it is determined by the FAA that the proposal provides adequate safeguards, it is the intention of the FAA to mandate this design change by AD action, and permit reactivation of the affected thrust reverser systems.

When a final design change has been approved, it in turn will be mandated by ad action, it is anticipated that these design changes will reduce or eliminate the requirement for repetitive tests and inspections of the thrust reverser system.

At present, operation of these airplanes with active thrust reverser systems is permitted. It is anticipated that certain repetitive system tests and inspections will be mandated by AD action.

The service bulletins necessary for these tests and inspections have already bean approved by the FAA. In addition, the electrical wiring for these airplanes is being examined for adequacy with respect to system separation and hot short protection.

At the completion of this investigation, it is expected that a final design change will be generated, which will reduce or eliminate the requirement for repetitive tests and inspections of the thrust reverser system.

Since these thrust reverser systems employ mechanically actuated directional control valves, it is felt that they do not possess the same potential for inflight reversal as those systems listed above.

This assumption is further supported by a trouble free service history to date with respect to uncommanded inflight deployments. A comprehensive investigation of the hydraulic system is in progress, and any AD action will depend upon the results of this investigation.

When a final design change is approved, It will be mandated by AD action. As an interim action, the FAA is issuing an immediate adopted AD the week of September 9, , which mandates initial and follow-on thrust reverser electrical system checks and replacement of those DCV solenoid valves which are susceptible to the contamination failure.

A copy of the AD is included with this letter. The Boeing Company is currently evaluating long term thrust reverser system configuration changes which could be terminating action to all or part of the repetitive electrical system inspections.

Boeing Model series airplanes powered by Rolls Royce RB engines employ a different hydraulically actuated thrust reverser design. This system is not susceptible to the contamination failure cited in the AD.

Design changes are being developed by Boeing to improve the reverser system. Boeing Model engine thrust reverser systems: Any applicable system improvements identified for the systems will be required on the in the long term.

No immediate actions are being taken on the because aerodynamic differences between the and the twin-engine airplanes result in adequate controllability with a reverser deployed.

Nevertheless, the FAA believes and Boeing agrees that inflight thrust reversals are undesirable, and all design improvements identified for the thrust reverser system will also be incorporated on airplanes.

Boeing has indicated that it plans to release system check service bulletins for the thrust reverser systems in the near future.

The FAA recommends that any Boeing-provided system cheeks be performed, but there are no current plans to release airworthiness directives requiring the performance of the system checks contained in these service bulletins.

While there are no plans for FAA action as of this date, results of these investigations may require that steps be taken to incorporate features or activities consistent with actions taken on other models.

In closing, we would like to point out that, in addition to the above, you should be aware that the Transport Airplane Directorate is conducting a Design review of the thrust reverser installations on other large jet transports manufactured by McDonnell-Douglas, Airbus Industries, Lockheed, etc.

As a result of that review, design changes may be required in the future. We request that you ensure that this letter is made available to airline flight departments and to all pilots of the above Boeing airplanes, to keep them fully apprised of the progress of this investigation.

Sincerely, original signed by Leroy A. Comments of the accredited representative of the United States of America were brief; and incorporated in the Final Report.

Comments of the accredited representative of Austria are appended. Brief edit items were incorporated in the Final Report. Comments on airline maintenance activities and the calls for further testing and analysis of the effects of reverser deployment and reexamination of the Dispatch Deviation Guide are provided to enlighten the reader.

These items were not included in the Final Report or Recommendations. The Accredited Representative of the Republic of Austria, whilst agreeing that this report is a fair record of the investigation, regrets that the report was unable to form any conclusion as to the reason for the uncommanded thrust reverser deployment which was the fundamental cause of the accident.

Whilst acknowledging the modifications package developed for aircraft similar to the Lauda machine and the recommendation for design reviews of all other aircraft certificated for ground-use only reverser systems, the lack of knowledge about the aerodynamic effects of deployment at high Mach numbers and Indicated Air Speeds should not be allowed to persist.

Accordingly it is felt that the report should call for further analysis and testing to be accomplished on the effects of reverser deployment throughout the flight envelope on aircraft of similar configuration to the Boeing In addition, it is noted that the requirements of FAR I am concerned by the apparent lack of analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder, being the only continuous record of the accident event in the.

There appears to be no attempt to interpret anything other than the cockpit speech although the recording contained considerably more recorded intelligence which, if anlalysed in-depth, may have yielded information about the crew's and the aircraft's behaviour following the inadvertent deployment.

I am also of the opinion that the Boeing Company's interpretation of their own Dispatch Deviation Guide requirements should be reexamined.

A repetitive EEC fault message that continues for some hours despite rectification actions is clearly not responding to these actions and yet could theoretically continue indefinitely as long as it does not manifest itself during the hour period allowed by the Dispatch Deviation Guide.

The following changes are proposed to be incorporated in the Final Report as they are written bold Italic , other comments should cause a more detailed explanation in the report:.

Page 2 Line Page 3 Line 7: The pilot-in-command, male, age 48, December 19, , valid until December 31, The co-pilot, First officer, male, 41 years of age, Civil Aviation of Austria issued April 24, Valid until October 24, Page 4 Line Post accident interrogation of the EEC non volatile memory, which dated to April 27 indicated a significantly higher number of similar messages occurred than were recorded in the documentations.

There was no radar recording of the accident flight available. Page 7 Line We feel the need to notify wind in velocity and direction in ft altitude steps under this headline or in the wreckage diagramme.

We feel the need to provide more evidence on the nature and the extent of the inflight fire or how the conclusion came up, that it occurred after the inflight break up.

Page 14 Line Page 15 Line 1: Page 16 Line 3: Page 19 Line 4: We feel the need to incorporate under this headline a sketch with breakup lines, sequences and reasons.

Page 40 Line PIMU, which began December 28, and continued for approx. Page 41 Line 9:

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